The Historical Roots of Future Conflict

We may well ask whether World War III began on 9/11 and further inquire whether the cost of sustaining this war has led to the collapse of the international banking system and subsequent global recession. Let’s not get too hung up on definitions; the Seven Years War was not called a “World War” though it was global in reach and had all the necessary geo-political dimensions and the First World War was only referred to as such after the dust had settled. What we are looking for in adumbrating the parameters of a future global conflict are the deepening of divisions between major international power blocs and an escalation of ideological struggles within key states which have the potential of spilling over borders. Nobody can have failed to recognise a general escalation of tensions of late particularly between NATO aligned Turkey and Israel over the storming of the Gaza flotilla but in a more general sense, if we are to talk of the potential of a future World War whom precisely are the belligerents, what are the alliances and what are the principle sources of grievances? President Bush called 9/11 “a declaration of war” but who is so mighty that they would declare war on the United States? Al Qaeda? Who or what is “Al Qaeda” and can this name mean anything anymore?

Seemingly Al Qaeda is in Iraq, Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and several other regions across the globe plotting the downfall of the United States mainly, if we are to accept the analysis of the Bush Doctrine, on account of the fact that they are irremediably “evil”. And not because they are disgruntled Saudi citizens and not because Saudi Arabia has a double Janus face; one side viciously supporting the West; the other viciously promoting “Islamic fundamentalism”. Clearly we cannot afford to draw a simple cleavage between the Muslim world and the secular West and yet with the exception of Kim Jong’s North Korea, so many of the world’s ever souring hotspots are characterised by this crucial religious, not to mention “traditionalist” vs. “modern” distinction. There is also a distinction, if it may be put this way, between the richer global north and the poorer global south with the European NATO alliance and the United States on one hand and the beleaguered populations of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Somalia and the Sudan on the other.

Our contention and the justifications we e for intervening in the politics of these countries is that we are attempting to provide long-term solutions for these areas whilst increasing our own ‘national security’. But isn’t maintaining a presence in these predominantly Muslim countries exacerbating the potential for future recruits to fall straight into the arms of those who espouse resistance to occupation via violent means? And how can we be so sure of our policies when we have never elicited the consensus of the populations of these countries? Illiteracy is high in many of these regions particularly Somalia, Pakistan and Afghanistan and their principle source of ‘news’ often comes directly from the mouths of their local imams and other religious leaders. How can the vast majority of the populations of these countries be expected to sympathise with the logic of our decisions to send troops into their homelands when we ourselves in the West are divided on that very issue? Predominantly Shi’ia Iran has just been voted further sanctions by the UN security council on account of its nuclear programme which it says is only for civilian purposes. Is the Iranian Ayatollah telling the truth when he insists that this is the case? Surely for a religious leader who derives his authority from the Koran he cannot be seen to be blatantly lying if subsequent events prove him false and there has been all along a nuclear weapons programme? Is there intelligence in Washington which indicates that the Ayatollah is no longer in control in Iran and that an internal coup has occurred placing a splinter faction from the Revolutionary Guards in control?

Leaving this aside, many regard nuclear armed Israel as the region’s most belligerent power. Their siege on Gaza last year in Operation Cast Lead was cruel, unjust and utterly disproportionate to the damage inflicted by rockets fired by Palestinian nationalists. Israel in turn accuse Iran of supporting “terrorist organisations” such as Hamas and Hizbollah. Yet nobody who lives in Lebanon or Palestine gives any credence whatsoever to this characterisation; on the contrary they are much more likely to regard these groups as defenders of their national rights. Seemingly unconnected to all this wider Middle East tension is China who hold so much American debt and who continue to endorse a policy of non-interference with North Korea who, quite incredibly, have only weeks ago blown to smithereens a South Korean naval vessel resulting in scores of deaths. Another declaration of war within a war that has yet to fulfil all, or even a fraction of its ramifications.

The Economist last week (June 2nd 2010), having presented an ostensibly balanced assessment of the ongoing unravelling of the peace talks between the Obama administration and Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition, to the effect that ‘progress really must be made you know’ because otherwise George Mitchell has just wasted the last nine months of his life trying to implement a ‘two-state, shared Jerusalem with zero further settlements’ but then peppers this seemingly progressive line (on progress) with the observation that 6 out of 10 Americans are more sympathetic towards Israel than they are towards the Palestinians. This same poll has now been reinserted three times into Economist articles focusing on the peace talks.

Now I don’t care who made up this poll and I don’t care how many people’s opinions were solicited; a straw poll by a private corporation on the most crucial issue of the day cannot in a reasonable world be put forward by one of the globe’s premier political and economic analytical magazines as an unshakeable truth to which the American President must look when deciding how he should best deal with Benjamin Netanyahu’s uncompromising stance. Apart from anything else, it cheapens and degrades the office of the Presidency and the character of its incumbent through the suggestion that poll figures are, at the end of the day, the most important criterion when it comes to making crucial decisions. Let’s not kid ourselves, of course they matter but aren’t we beyond this type of nonsense by now.

Obama will not face a bigger decision in his time than how to handle this issue of Israel and Palestine along with its multiple radial threads of conflict, mistrust, confusion, death, incompetence, economic string wire acts and ultimately potential disaster. How long more, in fact, can we afford to endure this mirror-stage of intercultural rivalry? Apart from the invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan and the ongoing threat of nuclear armed Pakistan falling into the hands of Islamic jihadists parameter wise, we often exclude the pillaging of the Somali coastline. This takes us into the African continent and the Sudanese non-compliance with the International Criminal Court’s directives to indict Bashir as they could cite the precedent of Security Council vetos which authorised further Israeli settlements to the detriment of their Palestinian co-religionists. The Arab League enjoined at this point and pan-African bodies were pressured into lobbying around Gadafi, whose vast oil reserves had already purchased European silence

If we are to talk of an escalating malaise, the theatre of operations is clearly not confined to the middle east. With respect to Somalia, this country was internally riven initially (post-Barre) by rival factions within the complex clan system, itself rooted in Islam. The piracy is a by-product of the collapse of state authority to manage the integrity of it's sea space. The conflict has now split between an Islamic grassroots movement (itself hybridizing) and formerly influential clan members of the Black Hawk Down warlord days who have been charged and sanctioned by the 'international community' to establish a government. The grassroots movement has now been pilloried (rightly or wrongly) of having associations with Afghani, Saudi etc dissident fundamentalist groups. It is here, at this point, in which this conflict assumes the face of a wider malaise. The more the US Congress hears of 'terrorist linkages', and there will be no shortage of evidence for that, the more inclined it is to pass measures which restrict the movements of those within this Islamic grassroots movement who are in effect bona fide improvers of their people's condition. They are looked up to and admired. Respected thus the hydra's head becomes manifold. The policy is doomed from the beginning.

With regard to the Sudan, we have no credibility left as international lawmakers to sway regional powerbrokers that may have been capable of stopping the Darfuri expropriations. Essentially, those people were left to rot because the international community - the UN and its agencies - could not appear even-handed in its dealings with a Muslim power, and we are all aware of the centrality of Sudan in the mid-80's in the push to empower the Mujahideen. But its not merely a hangover, it is a contemporary base for Hamas and so on. They are untouchable because of the residual weakness in the international executive caused by unconditional support of Israel. Truly this support has become a cancer; eating as it does into the politics of the Near, Far and Middle East, Northern Africa etc and exposing the vulnerabilities of oil and gas shipping routes in the Gulf of Aden.

This rot in our relations with the Muslim world creates a further dynamic in which formerly peripheral states are now presented with an opportunity to make leverage with our weakened position. Russia can flex its muscles with Georgia and China and continue to support that other eyesore Burma and the renegade state of North Korea. Chavez and co. in OPEC may well gloat; as "Peak Oil" dovetails with geopolitical uncertainty, it is also reasonable to expect limited support from the southern bloc until trade issues etc. have been rationalised. So, it may not be World War III yet but it’s becoming nastier and less confined to it’s ultimate nexus in Palestine and the Middle East. Timelines are pretty irrelevant and, in my opinion, we merely await our Gavrilo.