The revolutionary Cubans needed
little enticement from Khruschev to allow delivery and stationing of Russian
warheads on their newly reclaimed soil. The Bay of Pigs invasion was only the
precursor to ongoing CIA attempts to destabilise and ultimately bring an end to
the new regime; assassination attempts of the Castro brothers and Guevera were
likewise being constantly toyed with so anything that furthered their own
security even and especially a nuclear deterrent was seen as a positive boon. It
is arguable in fact how long the nascent communist state could have survived
without an overt gesture of Russian support and military backing.
The prior placement of US warheads on Turkish soil rankled Khruschev no end and in fact when seeking advise on the advisibility of reciprocating with a Cuban stockpiling of weapons he said it would be nice to "put a hedgehog down the Yankee's trousers for a change". But this is not to say that Khruschev wasn't compelled just as urgently by a genuine desire to 'protect and nurture' a Cuban revolution which many in Moscow, including himself, had actually begun to fall in love with - it all seemed too good to be true that Castro's constant prevarication on the issue of adopting a programme of socialist reform whilst he was fighting in the Sierra Maestre should after a brief period in power turn out to be a hankering to establish a bona fide communist state, but this is indeed what happened.
There had been no prior contact from the Soviet Union with the revolutionaries before the Granma embarked from Mexico to install the rebel invasion force in Cuba in 1958 and Moscow was second guessing the true nature of the political leanings of Castro as much as Washington. CIA analysts speculated that Castro would 'dump' the blatantly communist Guevara once he consolidated power and naturally hoped that the social democratic revolution being forged would stop short of genuine redistributionist policies.
The fact that Castro, who after all came from the finest hacienda Cuban stock complete with multi-acre sugar plantation was prepared to forswear all those family connections - which would have stood him in good stead had the revolution morphed into a typical Latin American coup wherein the furniture is switched but everything else remains the same (ie no deep structural reform is attempted) took a lot of analysts by surprise, none more so than Moscow. What was more, Guevera and Castro turned out to be passionate advocates for a Soviet system which was still recovering from the negative fallout occasioned by Khruschev's programme of 'de-Stalinization' and thus projected to the world a youthful and more vigorous gloss; ideal for pro-communist propagandists.
No, Cuba had become something special in the eyes of Moscow strategists - and indeed it was, objectively speaking - there was a genuine desire to protect the revolution from burgeoning American encroachment ('Operation Mongoose' aimed at toppling the regime had after the Bay of Pigs fiasco received to date from Kennedy the largest ever slice of financing for a covert operation of it's kind) and so the sense of solidarity between Moscow and Havana was real and necessary for both parties.
Of course, once the missiles had been removed Castro and Guevera were furious but Khruschev could at least say he obtained assurances from Kennedy that no future attempt to invade Cuba would be made - ostensibly the main reason he had for putting them there in the first place. This didn't wash with own party however who still saw the volte face as a humiliating climbdown - and eventually led to his ouster not long after.
But the Cuban revolution had been saved, of that there can be no doubt - no American President could ever authorize another Bay of Pigs type invasion force composed of Cuban exiles, mercenaries, Green Berets or anyone else; not after the world had stood on the brink of nuclear armaggedon over the issue of Cuba's right to protect it's populist revolution - and apart from business elites and large landowners (many of whom were American sugar barons) it was undoubtedly greeted by the vast majority of Cubans as an overwhelmingly positive event. Sartre, de Beauvoir and many other prominent commentators who visited during this time have left us with a very clear picture of the people's overall exultation during this time - Batista's corruption was notorious and he was seen by many as simply pimping out the country and it's resources; the ubiquitous brothels and casinos were eventually closed down and the gangsters such as Myer Lansky hightailed it before their expulsion.
Later, 'Mongoose' was wound down to a standstill, though this didn't stop the CIA assassination plots, but any overt attempt at invasion by the United States led to a risk of retaliatory nuclear strikes and in fact the upshot of the whole episode was to induce a thaw in Soviet-American relations with 'global peace' becoming the new buzzword in diplomatic circles - much to the disgust of Guevera who was still talking (and plotting) of a wider Latin America revolution; though without the backing of the majority of the continent's communist parties who were specifically reigned in by Moscow to avoid further confrontation in America's backyard.
The prior placement of US warheads on Turkish soil rankled Khruschev no end and in fact when seeking advise on the advisibility of reciprocating with a Cuban stockpiling of weapons he said it would be nice to "put a hedgehog down the Yankee's trousers for a change". But this is not to say that Khruschev wasn't compelled just as urgently by a genuine desire to 'protect and nurture' a Cuban revolution which many in Moscow, including himself, had actually begun to fall in love with - it all seemed too good to be true that Castro's constant prevarication on the issue of adopting a programme of socialist reform whilst he was fighting in the Sierra Maestre should after a brief period in power turn out to be a hankering to establish a bona fide communist state, but this is indeed what happened.
There had been no prior contact from the Soviet Union with the revolutionaries before the Granma embarked from Mexico to install the rebel invasion force in Cuba in 1958 and Moscow was second guessing the true nature of the political leanings of Castro as much as Washington. CIA analysts speculated that Castro would 'dump' the blatantly communist Guevara once he consolidated power and naturally hoped that the social democratic revolution being forged would stop short of genuine redistributionist policies.
The fact that Castro, who after all came from the finest hacienda Cuban stock complete with multi-acre sugar plantation was prepared to forswear all those family connections - which would have stood him in good stead had the revolution morphed into a typical Latin American coup wherein the furniture is switched but everything else remains the same (ie no deep structural reform is attempted) took a lot of analysts by surprise, none more so than Moscow. What was more, Guevera and Castro turned out to be passionate advocates for a Soviet system which was still recovering from the negative fallout occasioned by Khruschev's programme of 'de-Stalinization' and thus projected to the world a youthful and more vigorous gloss; ideal for pro-communist propagandists.
No, Cuba had become something special in the eyes of Moscow strategists - and indeed it was, objectively speaking - there was a genuine desire to protect the revolution from burgeoning American encroachment ('Operation Mongoose' aimed at toppling the regime had after the Bay of Pigs fiasco received to date from Kennedy the largest ever slice of financing for a covert operation of it's kind) and so the sense of solidarity between Moscow and Havana was real and necessary for both parties.
Of course, once the missiles had been removed Castro and Guevera were furious but Khruschev could at least say he obtained assurances from Kennedy that no future attempt to invade Cuba would be made - ostensibly the main reason he had for putting them there in the first place. This didn't wash with own party however who still saw the volte face as a humiliating climbdown - and eventually led to his ouster not long after.
But the Cuban revolution had been saved, of that there can be no doubt - no American President could ever authorize another Bay of Pigs type invasion force composed of Cuban exiles, mercenaries, Green Berets or anyone else; not after the world had stood on the brink of nuclear armaggedon over the issue of Cuba's right to protect it's populist revolution - and apart from business elites and large landowners (many of whom were American sugar barons) it was undoubtedly greeted by the vast majority of Cubans as an overwhelmingly positive event. Sartre, de Beauvoir and many other prominent commentators who visited during this time have left us with a very clear picture of the people's overall exultation during this time - Batista's corruption was notorious and he was seen by many as simply pimping out the country and it's resources; the ubiquitous brothels and casinos were eventually closed down and the gangsters such as Myer Lansky hightailed it before their expulsion.
Later, 'Mongoose' was wound down to a standstill, though this didn't stop the CIA assassination plots, but any overt attempt at invasion by the United States led to a risk of retaliatory nuclear strikes and in fact the upshot of the whole episode was to induce a thaw in Soviet-American relations with 'global peace' becoming the new buzzword in diplomatic circles - much to the disgust of Guevera who was still talking (and plotting) of a wider Latin America revolution; though without the backing of the majority of the continent's communist parties who were specifically reigned in by Moscow to avoid further confrontation in America's backyard.
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