The 1878 Congress of Berlin: Capping Balkan Nationalism

The background to the 1878 Congress of Berlin lay in the perennial tensions of the Balkans and the legitimate desire of its many nationalities for greater self-determination. Many ethnic minorities were struggling either under the yolk of the decaying Ottoman empire or the Habsburg dominated Austro-Hungarian empire. Allied with these nascent nationalisms were Russian imperial ambitions to expand its sphere of influence into the former republics of the Ottoman empire whilst the aims of the Habsburg dynasty of Austria-Hungary were to contain the threats posed by this encroachment of Russian power. British foreign policy at this time was to quietly support the Ottoman’s in the hope that it’s empire would act as a buffer to impede further Russian encroachment into the Middle East. Austria-Hungary, on the north west frontier of the Balkan zone contained within its ramshackle, creaking, multinational empire several ethnic minorities who either pined for their own shot at self-governance or sought to be assimilated within one of the newly independent Baltic states. This tendency was most pronounced amongst the Slavic subjects of the Habsburg dynasty whilst the slow disintegration of the Turkish Ottoman empire contributed to these tensions as one province after another either achieved full independence or became a tribute state less loosely aligned with Constantinople. All of these newly independent states were susceptible in varying degrees to influences from either Russia or Austria-Hungary who sought to manipulate their politics for their own ends.

It's enough to note that "Pan-Slavism" developed as a movement among intellectuals and poets in the early 19th century which sought to underline the common links that existed between the northern (Poles, Ukrainians), western (Czechs, Slovaks) and southern Slavs (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes). It’s first real emergence as a political force arose during the era of Napoleon’s domination of Europe when minorities feeling their interests were being sidelined by the Napoleonic Code began to stress the common links of history, culture and language which they shared. However, Pan-Slavism never took off as an internationalist movement amongst the northern and western Slavs but had considerable influence among the southern Slavs, particularly in the Balkans. Likewise, this movement was quickly appropriated by the Romanov dynasty in Russia to justify the continual occupation of Ukrainian and Polish territory and as a justification for their ongoing meddling in the politics of the Balkans. Pan-Slavism was thus rejected by many Slavic peoples particularly the Poles who had seen their independent commonwealth with Lithuania partitioned and their peoples absorbed by the Russian, Prussian and Austrian empires at the end of the 18th century. What most Polish looked for was instead an independent country to call their own. However, it was always possible for politically ambitious Slavs within Austria-Hungary or Serbia to receive Russian backing and financial support if they adopted a political programme of Pan-Slavism. Thus the multi-national empire of Austria-Hungary was continually under threat of being destabilised both by nationalist claims for greater self-determination and by the Russian imperialist propaganda of Pan-Slavism. Also, within the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy only the Germans, Hungarians, Romanians and Italians were non-Slavic thus this was a powerful ideology which needed to be monitored and contained by the Habsburgs.

Now we need to go back to 1875 and recall the uprisings that took place against Turkish Ottoman rule in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Macedonia and Bulgaria. In support of these rebellions the two small principalities of Serbia and Montenegro (who were still nominally under Turkish rule) declared war on the Sultan. British and French investors looked on anxiously as the Ottoman government defaulted on its loans but British political interests, as mentioned, were at this time in favour of a strong Turkish empire which provided a buffer against Russian expansion. The Crimean war, it should be recalled, in 1856, involving Britain, France and Russia was in fact largely fought by Britain in order to maintain control of Mediterranean trade routes and to deny further Russian advances towards Constantinople thereby checking Muscovite control of the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus which offered access to the Black Sea. The important issue for Britain was maintaining control of the land passage to India ‘the jewel in the British Crown’ and of protecting their wider commercial interests in the Middle East, particularly in Persia and Afghanistan.

By 1875, both Austria-Hungary and Russia were interested parties in these disturbances in the Balkans with the seeming collapse of the Ottoman empire being generally viewed as inevitable. Bismarck, anxious to maintain the integrity of Germany’s Dreikaiserbund (with Russia and Austria-Hungary) was keen not see his two allies fall out over rival territorial disputes, therefore putting himself forward as an ‘honest broker’ to mediate a resolution to the crisis. With the defeat of Serbia in the war against Turkey in 1876 an international conference to meet in Constantinople was convened largely under pressure from Russia to settle terms amicable to all parties. Britain had by this time purchased shares in the Suez canal from the khedive of Egypt which was still loosely governed by Turkey and so it was considered supportive of Ottoman interests.

However, at this conference Russia and Austria-Hungary struck a bargain. Russia would respect the claims for independence of Serbia and Montenegro if she were given a free hand in Rumania and Bulgaria. In return Bosnia and Herzegovina would be allowed fall under the Austro-Hungarian sphere of influence. On perceiving this realignment of interests the Turkish Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, who still wished to retain limited sovereignty for the Ottomans over the rebelling Balkan states promptly tore up the liberal constitution foisted upon him by the great powers. As a result the Russo-Turkish War broke out in April 1877. Romania joined Russia in May, Serbia went back to war in December, Bulgarian ‘irregulars’ now took arms against Turkey and Montenegro who had never called a ceasefire redoubled its war efforts. Turkey was swiftly defeated and in the resultant 1878 Treaty of San Stefano it undertook to recognise the independence of Serbia, Montenegro, a greatly enlarged Bulgaria and Rumania which now acquired new territory in Dobruja. Bosnia and Herzegovina however were to be kept within the ambit of Turkish suzerainty. The contentious issue now became that of the newly enlarged Bulgaria. Other Balkan states such as Rumania, Serbia and Greece resented the emergence of this new giant so close to their territories and Britain and Austria feared it would become a vehicle for Russian interests in the region.

The Congress of Berlin was now convened to redraw the map of the Balkans deliberating for a month during the summer of 1878. With Bismarck appointed as ‘honest broker’ the Russians were reasonably expectant that the outcome would be favourable. Serbia, Rumania and Montenegro were all reaffirmed in their independence but Rumania had to cede to Russia the territory of Bessarabia which she had lost after the Crimean War. Worst of all from the Russian perspective was that Bulgaria was cut in size by exclusion of Rumelia and Macedonia who were both now placed back under Turkish rule. During the Congress, secret negotiations between Britain and Turkey led to the signing of the Cyprus Convention which stipulated Britain’s willingness to defend the Turkish towns of Batoum, Ardahan and Kars by force of arms should Russia make attempt to appropriate them. Britain also supported Turkish claims to have Macedonia reincorporated into the Ottoman empire since a ‘Greater Bulgaria’ controlled by Russia would have access to the Aegean and thereby threaten the Straits (the Dardanelles and Bosporus) that separate the Black Sea from the Mediterranean. To further these ends Britain was now granted the control and administration of Cyprus.

After the Congress, Bulgaria was declared to be ‘an autonomous and tributary Principality under the Suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan’. By contrast Austria was allowed occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, Britain acquired Cyprus and France was given more power in Turkish controlled Tunisia. In other words, though Russia spearheaded the campaign to dismember the Ottoman Balkan territories she emerged only with a few Turkish towns, the territory of Bessarabia and a much reduced capacity to influence matters via a drastic reduction in the size and reshaping of the political composition of Bulgaria which she had initially hoped to reduce to a client state. This all put serious strain on the Dreikaiserbund and eventually laid the foundations for the perhaps unlikely alliances of the Triple Entente - even more so considering the manouevrings of the 'Great Game' being carried out throughout the latter half of the 19th century between Britain and Russia for control of the Near East. France, sensing Russia was now seeking an ally elsewhere stepped in to provide financial backing for Russian rearmanent and various infrastructural projects such as the Trans-Siberian railway. But it was clear that Britain’s policy of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman possessions in the Balkans as a buffer against Russian expansion had been the real guiding force throughout the negotiations of the Berlin conference. The nationalist aspirations of Rumelia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and to a great extent Bulgaria were thus sacrificed on the altar of political expediency mainly to the benefit of Britain, Austria and the Ottomans. What was worse was that the thorny question of Balkan nationalism was left in abeyance for another generation.

The long term failure of the Berlin Congress to address the Balkan peoples movements for independence became apparent thirty years later when in 1908 the struggle between the Young Turks and Sultan Abdul Hamid II for control of Turkey left the window open for some opportunistic territorializing by Austria-Hungary. The subsequent events led directly to the Balkan Wars of 1912 of which the First World War was merely a calamitous extension. They also left in tatters any hope of the German Kaiser, Willhelm II, should he have so desired it, of resurrecting Bismarck’s Dreikaiserbund. Taking advantage of the confusion wrought by the Turkish civil war Austria-Hungary formally annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina and King Ferdinand of Bulgaria declared his kingdom independent of Turkey. Serbian nationalism was now inflamed as Bosnia-Herzegovina contained over one million Serbs and henceforward it aligned itself firmly with Russia in opposing the machinations of Austria-Hungary. Both of these actions needless to say were violations of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin but none of the great powers bar Russia and the Turks - showed any inclination to convene a conference. Instead, Germany put enormous pressure on Russia to accept the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which at times amounted to a threat of war. In the end, Russia capitulated and on behalf of Bulgaria offered Turkey financial compensation for the loss of its territory with Austria doing likewise in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

So, really, in the continuing ferment of Balkan nationalism none of the great powers emerge with too much credibility. As is seen in the Congress of Berlin all of them at one point or another were guilty of cynically exploiting the vulnerabilities of the nascent Balkan states for their own territorial and political gain leaving in abeyance a frustrated nationalist ferment which only achieved a partial resolution in the trenches of the Great War.